Thursday, 28th of November, Bâtiment Le France, 10h-12h, SALLE 123, EPHE, 190-198 avenue de France, 75013 Paris
10h – Ken Manktelow, Wolverhampton University:
“Domain-specificity and delusional thinking”
People who are not diagnosed as clinically delusional can still exhibit varying levels of delusional ideation, and this tendency can be seen in their thinking, most commonly in the form of a jump-to-conclusions (JTC) bias. In a study of 96 people, we found that the JTC bias was subject to subtle content and contextual influences. The existence of these effects, and the JTC bias in general, raise questions for the characterisation of rationality in new-paradigm approaches to the psychology of reasoning.
11h – David Over, Durham University:
“Integrating the study of reasoning and judgment and decision making in the new psychology of reasoning”
The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning is a reflection of the great impact Bayesian approaches are having in cognitive psychology and cognitive science generally. The new developments are rightly called a paradigm shift, since they bring with them a new logic as the standard of correct reasoning. This standard itself rests on the even more fundamental notion of coherence, which is also the standard for rational probability judgment. Thus the paradigm shift opens up the possibility of integrating the fields of the psychology of reasoning and of judgment and decision making.